

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION  
**DEFECTOR RECEPTION CENTER**

COUNTRY Poland  
SUBJECT Soviet Influence on the Polish Army

50X1  
PLACE ACQUIRED [redacted]

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE [redacted] 50X1

DATE OF INFORMATION [redacted]

REPORT NO. [redacted]

50X1

DATE DISTR. 30 Sep 53

NO. OF PAGES 2

NO. OF ENCLS.  
(LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

50X1

SOURCE

[redacted]

- 50X1 1. In view of the fact that Soviet military and civilian instructors taught at OCS #1 in Wroclaw [redacted] that text material and instruction were based on the Soviet system and probably translated from the Russian language into Polish. [redacted] 50X1
- 50X1 the T/O & E and training program of the 62nd Inf. Regt. at Elk [redacted] were likewise based on the Soviet system and materials used were translated from Russian into Polish. [redacted] 50X1
- 50X1 Polish officer instructors at the chemical warfare course in Olsztyn [redacted] the subject material in chemical service texts then in use was also translated from Russian into Polish.
- 50X1 2. [redacted] no knowledge of Polish officers being sent to the USSR or any Satellite for special training. 50X1
3. Most of the weapons and equipment used in the 62nd Inf. Regt. were Soviet. [redacted] small weapons, such as some pistols, carbines, and machine pistols (SMG's), were produced in 1951 - 1952 by the munitions factory at Radom. [redacted] no knowledge of Soviet weapons and equipment being promised to any Polish Army unit or of any Soviet supply depot furnishing weapons and equipment to the Polish Army. 50X1

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4. In all training and in political lectures in the 62nd Inf. Regt., emphasis was placed on the role of the new Polish fighting man. Stress was placed on the Polish soldier being conscious of his importance in the new democracy and his being willing to die in defending Poland from the Western imperialists. Oddly enough, attack by Polish forces was not stressed, despite the fact that tactics favoring attack were taught more than defense tactics.
5. The soldiers had no alternative but to receive the political indoctrination given them. However, officers and enlisted men did not appear to readily accept the political indoctrination. The soldiers were not permitted to question the political propaganda being given. 50X1 [redacted] if less time and effort were given to political propaganda, there would actually be more acceptance of the "lies" propagated by the political indoctrination instructors.
6. Other than the 1951 trial of two Polish general officers, MOSSER (fnu) and SPYCHALSKI (fnu), and six others accused of conspiring against the state, [redacted] purges of Polish Army officers. 50X1
7. [redacted] issue one pass per month to the enlisted men of [redacted]. Due to this limited pass policy, plus the fact that regular Army NCO's and officers had more privileges and were entitled to take an annual 30-day leave while even emergency leaves for EM were limited, enlisted men in the 62nd Inf. Regt. were always dissatisfied. Punishment for disturbances while marching, for refusal to carry out orders quickly, for attempting defection, and for attempting to leave the camp area without permission, plus poor pay, poor food, and a strenuous military training schedule made for low morale and poor response to the iron discipline in the 62nd Inf. Regt. Catholic soldiers were discriminated against by not being given a pass for Sunday services and by being ridiculed for believing in their religion. In 1952, at OCS #1 in Wroclaw, there were two incidents where between 10 and 20 cadets attempted defection because of the rigorous training program, poor food, lack of leisure time, and general disgust with the indoctrination program. Most of them were apprehended, [redacted] to them. 50X1 50X1
8. [redacted] the names of the Soviet personnel at OCS #1. They wore Polish uniforms with the insignia of captain or major. They spoke Polish poorly when giving instruction in the subjects which they taught, namely, infantry tactics and marksmanship. Soviet civilians instructed OCS personnel in the Russian language.
9. In the 62nd Inf. Regt., Maj. GESIOROWSKI (fnu) was CO of the regiment. This officer spoke Polish poorly and was very hateful toward the regiment and Polish officers. I believe that he was a Soviet.
10. In 1953 the 62nd Inf. Regt. was inspected by a team of Polish officers and one lieutenant colonel who was in Soviet uniform.
11. [redacted] Soviet military advisors (doradcy) were in high positions in the Polish Armed Forces Headquarters in Warsaw. 50X1 [redacted] no information on Soviet administrative units, control commissions, or advisory committees. 50X1

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